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Abstract
Information security maturity is the measurement of the organisation’s capability to remain secure. This article
focuses on the social aspect of the management approach as part of a larger study that uses a socio-technical
theory as a basis for analysing the relationship between the social and technical factors in the information
security management system of Malaysian Public Service organisations. The empirical analysis was conducted to
identify the antecedents of the information security maturity of an organisation, mainly through the study of
several social factors. Through the sample obtained from the key players of information security in Malaysian
Public Service organisations, results of the multivariate test reveal the underlying dimensions of a few social
factors. The final result provides empirical proof of the social factors that has the most influence on the
Malaysian Public Service organisations’ information security maturity.
Keywords
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INTRODUCTION
Information security is often mistaken to revolve around technical issues and usually delegated to information
system entity within an organisation. This view is slowly changing especially in the commercial enterprise
where the risks involved for the organisation is no longer limited to compromise of information system or
network infrastructure but also include legal liabilities, loss of trust and severe financial repercussion
(McAdams, 2004). It is said that the involvement of top management is crucial in the acculturation of
information security in all levels of the organisation (Von Solms et al, 2004; ITGI, 2003; Andersen, 2001). The
Malaysian Public Service (MPS) may not have exactly the same security issues as those commercial enterprises
but the stakes are similar. Public trust, national sovereignty, national security and service delivery are at risk.
Hence confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the information asset should be the ultimate goal of
information security management in MPS organisations and that would be reflected in the information security
maturity level of the organisations.
Using social-technical theory as guidance, this study examines the information security management practices in
the MPS organisations by focusing on the social aspect of the management system. The article is part of a larger
research study that deployed a survey questionnaire measuring the social factors namely the perception of the
information security custodians in the organisation, the organisation’s security culture and the technical factor
recognized as the formal mechanism of managing information security. The criterion is the information security
maturity measured through the organisation’s information security management practice and control. A socialtechnical perspective describes the organisation as a composite of a social system and a technical system
(Kawalek, 1996; Cherns, 1976). In the context of information security management system, the social system is
made up of people and their concern where as the technical system is the management tool used in the system
(Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001; Land, 2000).
In the next section, the literature on the criterion and factors are briefly reviewed. Then the article discussed the
quantitative study deployed followed by the multivariate tests to describe the relationships of the variables. The
theoretical and managerial findings are also presented.

LITERATURE REVIEW
Malaysian public service like other public and private enterprises in the world has seen a rapid deployment of
information system throughout the enterprise for the past two decades. Intrinsic in this endeavour is the
importance of information protection, which is linked to the emerging knowledge of information security.
Changing times bring forth new dimensions to the concept of information security. In the beginning, when the
computing world used to consist only of a centralised and isolated mainframes or mini computer, the challenge
of managing security is not as overwhelming compared to current borderless scenario. As the technological
systems grow more sophisticated and complex so does the security threat. The perpetrator is just not the
technology alone but the social systems consisting of the organisation, individual and society. Schneier (2000)
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observed that users often represent the weakest link in the security chain. Putting in placed all the technological
based security solution is a futile effort if the people interacting with the system do not implement prudent
security practice. A study of an effective information security management system would not be complete if it
does not consider the organisation, human and social factors besides the technological factor (Dhillon &
Backhouse, 2001; Schneier, 2000; Armstrong, 1999).
Information Security Maturity
Information security maturity of an organisation is the measurement of the organisation’s capability to remain
secure. Siponen (2002) suggested that information security maturity could be a mean of self-assessment by the
organisation. It could also be an approach that demonstrates to either the internal or external parties the
confidence in the security level or maturity of an organisation. In this study, the maturity levels are measured
based on the extent information security management processes are successfully implemented in an organisation.
Three standards or methodologies found to take the maturity level approach to information security are Cobit:
Management Guidelines (ISACA, 2000), The Information Security Management Maturity Model - ISM3 V1.0
(Aceituno, 2004), and System Security Engineering-Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM, 1998).
Two models were used as references for this study; the Information Security Maturity Model ISM3 V1.0
(Aceituno, 2004) and the information security processes and practices maturity model found in Cobit:
Management Guidelines (ISACA, 2000). Both model use process oriented approach towards information
security management and have similar description for all levels 1 to 5. Each of the maturity level described
processes that reflect the extent information security management processes are implemented hence the
information security level of the organisation.
Organisation responsibility and communication structure and Other Social Factors
Organisational culture has a significant function in the implementation of information security. Although
cultivating an information security culture is vital, the current perspective on information security
culture is not well defined and there is only limited literature available on the concept (Andress, 2000;
Borck, 2000; Eloff & Von Solms, 2000; Gaunt, 2000). Information security characteristics such as integrity and
availability of information need to be valued and pursued by the organisation. Information security culture is
also an assumption about what is and what is not acceptable in relation to information security. Information
security culture will also emerge from encouraging acceptable information security behaviour. An example
could be that people are encouraged to report security incidents via the appropriate management channels.
Information security culture can thus be defined as the assumption about which type of information security
behaviour is accepted and encouraged in order to incorporate information security characteristics as the way in
which things are done in an organisation (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001).
Instilling an information security culture requires the commitment of the senior management and the cooperation
of the group or individual levels of the organisation. Issues such as information security policy and information
security awareness as well as training need to be addressed by an organisation to develop a culture conducive to
the protection of information assets. (Von Solms & Thomson, 2005) This research does not examine the
organisational behaviour that influences the information security culture rather the management practices
formulated at the senior management level and adhering to procedure at the individual or group level as the
manifestations of the entrenched security conscious culture. On another level are the perceptions of the people
responsible for the information security. Among those perceptions is their regard for the value of information
security, the perception about risk elements such as threat that could harm critical operation or vulnerability of
the information system as well as their perceptions about what constitute as barriers to secure information assets
(Ezingeard and Bowen-Schrire, 2003; Musekura, J.B. & Ekh, R., 2003; Wallace at al, 2002).

METHODOLOGY
A quantitative approach using a survey questionnaire as the data collection methodology was chosen as the
research design for this study. The empirical data obtained would enable the study between antecedent social
factors and information security maturity. Consequently, relationship-based statistical measures were employed.
Population and Sample
A mail survey was carried out and 210 useable questionnaires were returned indicating 21.6% response rate.
Response bias was determined using wave analysis method (Leslie, 1972), whereby responses to questions
pertaining to the three construct was examined weekly over 8 weeks period. There were no significant
differences found between the responses in the final weeks and the earlier ones, thus establishing a strong case
for absence of response bias. The sampling frame constitutes a list of 970 individuals comprising 180 chief
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information officer, 100 information and communications technology (ICT) managers, 630 ICT security officers,
and 60 line-of-business managers. The people basically represent the senior management, middle management
and the operational level positions. The respondents consist of civil servant carrying various roles related to
information and communications technology, with one role in common vis-à-vis the administration and
management of information security in their organisations.
Measurement
The questionnaire was structured as Section 1 to Section 10 each encompassing a different subject as shown in
Table.
Table 1: Questionnaire Structure
Section
1

Subjects
Information Security Incidents Experienced by Organisations (Not Relevant To Article)

2

Value Of Information Security To My Organisation

3

Presence of Security-conscious Cultures In Organisation

4

Responsibility And Communications Structure For The Management Of Information Security

5

Information Security Related Policies And Procedures

6

The Handling Of Information Security Incidents And The Assurance Of Service Continuity

7

Awareness About The Elements Of Information Security Risks And Its Management

8

Barriers To Effective Information Security

9

Safeguard Measures Deployed In The Organisation (Not Relevant To Article)

10

Background Information Of Respondents

Measures of Dependent and Independent Variables
The information security maturity as dependent variable and the independent variables were measured using 45
and 69 items respectively. The scales were developed based on analysis of information security issues and
processes found in the literatures. The respondents were asked whether they agree to the statements about issues
and practices of information security management in their organisations. Each item in the construct consist of a
seven-point Likert scale ranging from 1=strongly disagree to 7=strongly agree.
Consistent with the conventional process, the questionnaire was pre-tested with four categories of people. In the
first stage, the selected individuals were the information security specialists from MAMPU (Malaysian
Management and Modernisation Planning Unit of Prime Minister’s Department)1, a Professor from a local
university, the information security specialists from private consulting companies and the information security
managers from government-linked companies. The pre-testers were asked to indicate ambiguities or difficulties
with the instruments and to make suggestions for improvement. After modification was carried out the revised
instrument was tested on information security academics and after further revisions a pilot test with potential
respondents was carried out. As no significant ambiguities were reported at this stage the pre-testing provided
evidence of content validity and the instrument was adopted.

RESULTS
Validity and Reliability of the Research Constructs
Approach to ascertain content validity of the scales has been discussed in the previous paragraph. Here, the
discussion revolved around assuring construct validity of the instrument. Multi-item indicators used for
measuring the three research variables were tested for construct validity and reliability. The construct validity
was evaluated using factor analysis to confirm whether all the items measuring the construct cluster together to
measure a single construct. The method of principal component with varimax rotation was used for factor
analysis. The minimum factor loading for the construct is more than 0.5, a value considered to be practically
significant loading limit (Hair et al, 1998). The internal consistencies of items for each factor are gauged
through the computation of Cronbach’s coefficient alpha score. As this study is exploratory in nature alpha
score of above 0.6 is deemed sufficient for further analysis (Malhotra, 2004; Hair et al, 1998). All scales were
found to exceed the minimum threshold of 0.6. The results of each item’s factor loading and group’s alpha
scores are shown in Table 2 and Table 3.
1

MAMPU is an entity under the Prime Minister’s Department, which is responsible for the Malaysian Public
Service information security policy and programme implementation.

-3-

17th Australasian Conference on Information Systems
6-8 Dec 2006, Adelaide

Information Security Maturity
Dzazali

Underlying Dimensions of Information Security Maturity
In this study, measure of information security maturity used 45 items in the questionnaire. The original number
of items was reduced to 23 items after principal component analysis process that also revealed two underlying
dimensions as shown in Table 2. The appropriate cut-off significant loading point is 0.5, based on number of
sample and the underlying principle of practically significant (Hair et al, 1998).
The first dimension is the management process for information security maturity. Analysis of the items highly
loaded under the first dimension reveal that they mostly belong to the maturity level 3 to 5 of the information
security maturity rankings (Aceituno, 2004; ISACA, 2000). The responses towards the fifteen items showed
the mean distribution ranging from 4.17 to 5.09. Most respondents said that in their organisations the intrusion
testing is a standard and formalised process lead to improvement (mean=5.09, SD=1.583). This is followed by
the practices where information security incidents and response handling responsibilities are assigned, managed
and enforced (mean=4.90, SD=1.425). Interestingly the third highest mean for this dimension is also related to
security incident handling, where the respondents agreed that root caused analysis of security incidents is the
basis for continuous improvement (mean=4.79, SD=1.475).
The second dimension comprised of items that describe risk assessment process. The mean of the distribution of
risk assessment variables were more than 4.16. The respondents tend to agree that cost/benefit analysis is
increasingly being used to support the implementation of security measures associated with risk assessment
findings (mean=4.28, SD=1.355). While most respondents tend to agree that risk assessment process were
practiced in their organisation as indicated by items Ism 16 to 17 and 20 to 23 (mean ranging between 4.15 to
4.28), they however tend to disagree that there are defined and documented risk assessment process available as
evidenced in their responses to item 18 and 19 shown in Table 2.
In general, the findings suggest that the key players of information security management in MPS think that their
organisations had put into practice processes towards achieving information security maturity.
Mean

Std.
Dev.

Loading

Information Security Maturity

0.944

Ism1

Information security policies implemented and enforced.

4.60

1.474

.811

Ism2

Information security process and technology are integrated.

4.64

1.650

.787

Ism3

Critical system inventory strictly maintained.

4.79

1.584

.773

Ism4

Information security processes co-ordinate with
organisational functions.
User identification, authentication or authorization is
standardized.
Clearly assigned responsibility for information security

4.67

1.575

.750

4.57

1.354

.738

4.64

1.593

.721

4.42

1.423

.686

4.90

1.425

.649

5.06

1.583

.648

4.82

1.475

.629

4.68

1.347

.625

4.17

1.518

.620

4.62

1.344

.594

Ism5
Ism6
Ism7
Ism8
Ism9
Ism10
Ism11
Ism12
Ism13

Alpha Score

Standard Operating Procedures are defined and fit
information security policy.
Information security incident and response handling
responsibilities are assigned, managed and enforced.
Intrusion testing is standard and formalized process leading
to improvement.
Root cause analysis of security incidents is the basis for
continuous improvement.
Policies and procedure developed based on security
baseline.
Pro-active identification of risk is the basis for continuous
improvement.
Incidents are promptly addressed with formalised incident
response procedures supported by automated tools.

Ism14

Responsibilities and standards for continuous service are
enforced.

4.69

1.387

.590

Ism15

Continuous service plans and business continuity plans are
integrated, aligned and routinely maintained.

4.23

1.555

.536
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Risk Assessment
Ism16

0.895

An organisation-wide policy defines when and how to
conduct risk assessments
Risk assessment is a structured, organisation-wide process.

4.15

1.408

.860

4.20

1.477

.854

Risk assessment follows a defined process that is
documented and available to all staff through training.
Failure to follow the standard risk assessment procedure is
detected by the management.

3.90

1.376

.822

3.96

1.449

.784

Ism20

Top management has determined the levels of risk that the
organisation would tolerate and have standard measures for
risk/return ratios.

4.27

1.423

.772

Ism21

Risk assessment is conducted when changes affecting
organisational asset occur.

4.24

1.319

.747

Ism22

Cost/benefit analysis, supporting the implementation of
security measures, is increasingly being utilised.

4.28

1.355

.660

Ism23

Informal risk assessments of project-by-project basis take
place as determined by each project.

4.25

1.260

.546

Ism17
Ism18
Ism19

Table 2

Descriptive Statistics and Reliability Analysis of Information Security Maturity

Underlying Dimensions of the Social Factors
The results of factor analysis on the independent variables revealed five social factors as shown in Table 3. They
are Organisation Structure, Awareness and Training Culture, Individual Perception on Information Security,
Perceived Social Barriers, and Perceived Technical Barriers.
Mean

Std.
Dev.

Loading

Factor 1: Organisation Structure

0.890

Os1

Information security unit/personnel plays important role in
decision-making process about information security.

4.94

1.497

.739

Os2

The operation of the overall information security structure is
evaluated and adjusted to adapt to changing conditions.

4.70

1.396

.687

Os3

Information security plans and details communicated to all
unit/division head.

4.64

1.526

.679

Os4

Information security unit/personnel get business objectives
& needs from relevant unit head.

4.26

1.564

.640

Os5

Information security awareness communicated regularly to
all users.

4.32

1.457

.599

Os6

Sensitive actions are logged to assign responsibility.

4.68

1.357

.564

Factor 2: Awareness and Training Culture

0.858

At1

User trained to identify and report suspicious activity

4.41

1.585

.750

At2

Continuous training for employee

4.34

1.456

.698

At3

Digital operation data classification

4.22

1.601

.689

At4

Manual operation data classification

4.52

1.494

.630

At5

Information security awareness briefing is standardised and
formalized.

4.10

1.418

.560

At6

Checking of information system or network log is daily
routine.
Information security awareness briefing is mandatory

4.39

1.736

.550

3.70

1.562

.534

At7

Factor 3: Individual Perception on Information Security
Ip1

Alpha Score

0.893

Information security important to successful service delivery
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Information security is important for achieving organisation’s
goal
Unauthorised modification of information is tackled

5.97

1.294

.739

5.24

1.419

.738

Organisation success rely on exchange of information with

5.39

1.418

.722

other parties

Ip5

Essential service rely on information

5.26

1.605

.683

Ip6

Unauthorised disclosure is tackled

5.19

1.393

.679

Ip7

Leader appreciate information security value

5.76

1.338

.674

Ip8

Organisation gather information to comply with regulation

5.15

1.469

.623

Ip9

Organisation accumulate sensitive information

5.06

1.418

.620

.666

Factor 4: Social Barriers

0.798

Ps1

Lack of management commitment.

4.31

1.657

Ps2

Lack of security awareness among users.

5.11

1.475

.605

Ps3

Lack of management awareness.

5.21

1.366

.600

Ps4

3.88

1.740

.586

Ps5

Lack of clear Government guideline on information security
management.
Lack of information security skilled staff.

4.49

1.615

.583

Ps6

Difficulty proving the value of information security.

4.83

1.440

.576

Pr2

Lack of time to implement information security process.

4.40

1.438

.562

Pr3

Balancing the need for meeting business/service objectives

4.73

1.345

.504

1.464

.638

and maintaining security.
Factor 5: Technical Barriers

0.668

Pt1

Budget constraints or limitation.

5.33

Pt2

Fast pace of information technology change.

5.23

1.308

.563

Pt3

Rapid changes to the type of attacks on information system.

5.26

1.323

.519

Table 3 Descriptive Statistics and Reliability Analysis of Five Social Factors
Relationship between the social factors and the information security maturity of organisation
How well do the five social factors influence ISM and which one of the social factors is the most influential was
determined by performing linear multiple regressions.
Multiple R
R2
Adjusted R2
Standard error

.796
.634
.625
14.057

Regression
Residual

DF
5
199

Independent Variable
Individual Perception on
Information Security
(IPS)

Analysis of Variance
Sum of Squares
Mean Square
68146.778
13629.356
39320.557
197.591
Variables in the Equation
SEB
Beta

B

F
68.978
t

Significance of F
.000
Significance of t

.273

.122

.111

2.750

.027

Organisation Structure
(OC)

1.767

.166

.544

10.618

.000

Awareness and Training
Culture (ATC)

. 859

.151

.299

5.684

.000

*Perceived Social Barriers
(PSB)

-.040

.141

-.013

-.281

.779

-.366

.346

-.051

-1.059

.291

2.750

.007

*Perceived Technical
Barriers (PTB)
(Constant)

22.554

8.201

Table 4: Predicting Information security maturity (ISM) by five social factors
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As depicted in Table 4, three out of five factors were found to be significant predictors of information security
maturity. The three significant factors are included in the following model:
ISM = 22.554 + 1.767 (OC) + .859 (ATC) + .273 (IPS)
All three independent variables were significant (p<0.05) and they accounted for most of the explained variance
(R2 = .634; Adjusted R2 = .625). The values for both R2 and Adjusted R2 are very close indicating that both
contribute much in explaining information security maturity. The value of Adjusted R2 suggests that 63.4 per
cent of what influence the information security maturity of an organisation is explained by the three social
factors. Nevertheless the relative importance of each social factor still needs further analysis. Organisation
structure has the highest predictor (beta=.544), followed by Awareness and Training Culture (beta=.299) and
Individual Perception on Information Security (beta=.111). In summary, clearly Organisation responsibility and
communication structure is relatively more important in predicting the information security maturity than the
other two social factors.

DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSION
The goal of information security management is to establish and maintain a security programme that
ensures at least three requirements are met; the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the
organisation’s information resources. It is measured through the Information security maturity level, which
represent the assessment of security processes in deployed by the organisation.
What these results suggest is that, if an organisation desires to increase its information security maturity level it
is more significant to put effort or resources in instituting positive information security culture through topdriven initiatives rather than depending on the individual information security key player. Viewed from another
perspective, any individual entrusted with the organisation’s information security responsibility will stand a
better chance in increasing the information security maturity level if he/she can get senior management’s
commitment and support before initiating any related programme. Concerted effort between all units dealing
with information assets and the senior management drives for continuous improvement will create positive
information security culture able to meet the highly challenging information security threats and issues. The
findings imply that indeed information security maturity is not exclusive to the technical environment.
Improvement to information security posture of the organisation should take into account the process of
institutionalising security conscious culture right from the strategic level at the top of the organisation down to
the operational level. The findings also suggest that Awareness and Training Culture should not be neglected.
The study succeeded in obtaining empirical evidence of the information security management practices in
Malaysian Public Service. The results with regard to processes in practiced are consistent with the international
best practices adopted by many organisations worldwide. However, as the study deployed a quantitative method
future effort should combine it with the qualitative approach for a more rigorous data of the information security
practices and perceptions.
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